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ABSTRACT 
Notifying users about a system’s data practices is supposed 
to enable users to make informed privacy decisions. Yet, 
current notice and choice mechanisms, such as privacy poli­
cies, are often ineffective because they are neither usable 
nor useful, and are therefore ignored by users. Constrained 
interfaces on mobile devices, wearables, and smart home de­
vices connected in an Internet of Things exacerbate the is­
sue. Much research has studied usability issues of privacy 
notices and many proposals for more usable privacy notices 
exist. Yet, there is little guidance for designers and develop­
ers on the design aspects that can impact the effectiveness of 
privacy notices. In this paper, we make multiple contribu­
tions to remedy this issue. We survey the existing literature 
on privacy notices and identify challenges, requirements, and 
best practices for privacy notice design. Further, we map out 
the design space for privacy notices by identifying relevant 
dimensions. This provides a taxonomy and consistent ter­
minology of notice approaches to foster understanding and 
reasoning about notice options available in the context of 
specific systems. Our systemization of knowledge and the 
developed design space can help designers, developers, and 
researchers identify notice and choice requirements and de­
velop a comprehensive notice concept for their system that 
addresses the needs of different audiences and considers the 
system’s limitations and opportunities for providing notice. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of a privacy notice is to make a system’s users 
or a company’s customers aware of data practices involving 
personal information. Internal practices with regard to the 
collection, processing, retention, and sharing of personal in­
formation should be transparent to users. The privacy notice 
acts as a public announcement of those practices. Privacy 
notices can take different shapes and leverage different chan­
nels, ranging from a privacy policy document posted on a 
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website, or linked to from mobile app stores or mobile apps, 
to signs posted in public places to inform about CCTV cam­
eras in operation. Even an LED indicating that a camera 
or microphone is active and recording constitutes a privacy 
notice, albeit one with limited information about the data 
practices associated with the recording. Providing notice 
about data practices is an essential aspect of data protec­
tion frameworks and regulation around the world [57]. While 
transparency has been emphasized as an important practice 
for decades, existing privacy notices often fail to help users 
make informed choices. They can be lengthy or overly com­
plex, discouraging users from reading them. 
Smartphones and mobile apps introduce additional pri­
vacy issues as they support recording of sensor and behav­
ioral information that enables inference of behavior patterns 
and profiling of users. Yet, comparatively smaller screens 
and other device restrictions constrain how users can be 
given notice about and control over data practices. 
The increasing adoption of wearable devices, such as smart 
watches or fitness trackers, as well as smart home devices, 
such as smart thermostats, connected light bulbs, or smart 
meters, represents a trend towards smaller devices that are 
even more constrained in terms of interaction capabilities, 
but are also highly connected with each other and the cloud. 
While providing notice and choice is still considered essential 
in the“Internet of Things”(IoT) [48, 74], finding appropriate 
and usable notice and choice mechanisms can be challenging. 
The challenges of providing usable privacy notice have 
been recognized by regulators and researchers. For instance, 
FTC chairwoman Edith Ramirez [107] stated in the IoT con­
text: “In my mind, the question is not whether consumers 
should be given a say over unexpected uses of their data; 
rather, the question is how to provide simplified notice and 
choice.” An extensive body of research has studied usability 
issues of privacy notices (e.g., [14, 33, 64, 51]) and proposed 
improved notice interfaces (e.g., [34, 66, 67]), as well as tech­
nical means to support them (e.g., [75, 127, 131]). Multi­
stakeholder processes have been initiated in the wake of the 
White House’s proposed Consumer Bill of Rights [122] to 
tackle transparency and control issues of mobile privacy [92] 
and facial recognition [93]. While such efforts have resulted 
in guidance for notices in the context of particular systems, 
they have given little consideration to usability [14]. 
Existing frameworks and processes for building privacy­
friendly systems, such as Privacy by Design [36] or privacy 
impact assessments [136], focus on the analysis of a system’s 
data practices and less so on the design of notices. Even the 
OECD report on “making privacy notices simple” [94] basi­
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cally states that one should design a simplified notice, con­
duct usability tests, and deploy it – the crucial point of how 
to design a simplified notice is not addressed. Common pro­
posals to improve the usability of privacy notices are the use 
of multi­layered notices [9, 26] or just­in­time notices [47]. 
Despite the previous work on privacy notices, transparency 
tools, and privacy mechanisms, a system designer or devel­
oper has very little guidance on how to arrive at a privacy 
notice design suitable and appropriate for their specific sys­
tem and its respective characteristics. Existing best prac­
tices are spread throughout the literature and have not pre­
viously been organized into a comprehensive design frame­
work. As a result, privacy notices are often hastily bolted 
on rather than well­integrated into a system’s interaction de­
sign. Designers may not be aware of the many alternatives 
for designing usable privacy notices and therefore do not 
systematically consider the options. Furthermore, designers 
and researchers do not yet have a standard vocabulary for 
describing privacy notice options. 
In this paper, we make multiple contributions to ease the 
design of privacy notices and their integration into a system. 
The goal is to help developers embed privacy notices and 
choice options into their system design where relevant, with 
minimal disruption to the system’s interaction flow. First, 
we identify challenges, requirements, and best practices for 
the design of privacy notices. Based on a survey of existing 
literature and privacy notice examples, we develop a design 
space of privacy notices. This design space and its dimen­
sions provide a systemization of knowledge and a taxonomy 
to foster understanding and reasoning about opportunities 
for privacy notices and controls. We demonstrate the util­
ity of our design space by discussing existing privacy notice 
approaches in different domains. 
2. BACKGROUND 
The concept of privacy notices is founded on the idea that 
users of services and systems that collect or process personal 
information should be informed about what information is 
collected about them and for which purposes, with whom it 
is shared, how long it is stored, and their options for con­
trolling or preventing certain data practices [45, 95]. Given 
such transparency, users should be able to make informed 
privacy and consent decisions. 
2.1 Roles of Privacy Notices 
Privacy notices serve different roles depending on a stake­
holder’s perspective. Consumers, companies, and regulators 
see privacy notices in different ways. 
For companies, privacy notices serve multiple purposes, 
including demonstrating legal compliance and building cus­
tomer trust. Privacy notices are often primarily a neces­
sity to ensure compliance with legal and regulatory require­
ments, rather than a tool to create transparency for users. 
For instance, the European Data Protection directives have 
strict notice requirements [41, 43]. In the U.S., not provid­
ing notice could be interpreted as a deceptive trade practice 
by the FTC [45] or violate federal, state, or sector­specific 
privacy legislation, such as CalOPPA [96] or HIPAA [27]. 
Yet, there are also intrinsic reasons why businesses and 
system designers should aim to provide privacy notices that 
are meaningful to users. Being upfront about data prac­
tices – especially about those that may be unexpected or 
could be misinterpreted – provides the opportunity to ex­
plain their purpose and intentions in order to gain user ac­
ceptance and avoid backlash. Furthermore, companies that 
provide privacy­friendly and secure systems can leverage pri­
vacy notices to make users aware of privacy­friendly data 
practices. Implementing and highlighting good security and 
privacy practices can further create a competitive advantage 
as users may perceive the system as more trustworthy. 
Regulators, such as data protection authorities or the FTC, 
rely on companies’ privacy notices – primarily their privacy 
policies – as an important tool to investigate and enforce reg­
ulatory compliance [31]. If a company violates its privacy 
policy, it provides regulators with a basis to take action; 
for example, the FTC may treat a violation as an unfair 
or deceptive trade practice [45, 116]. Further, data protec­
tion authorities in Europe and other countries may assess 
whether the described practices meet more stringent crite­
ria, such as use limitation, proportionality of data practices, 
and user access options [41, 43]. 
2.2 Hurdles to Effective Privacy Notices 
While privacy notices fulfill many roles for different stake­
holders, in practice most privacy notices are ineffective at in­
forming consumers [33, 83]. This ineffectiveness stems from 
hurdles that can be attributed not only to general shortcom­
ings of the notice and choice concept [25, 33, 116], but also 
to the challenges in designing effective privacy notices. 
Notice complexity. The different roles of privacy notices 
result in a conflation of requirements. Besides informing 
users about data practices and their choices, privacy notices 
serve to demonstrate compliance with (self­)regulation and 
limit the system provider’s liability [23]. As a result, pri­
vacy notices often take the shape of long privacy policies or 
terms of service that are necessarily complex because the 
respective laws, regulations, and business practices are com­
plex [25]. For instance, website privacy policies are typically 
long, complex documents laden with legal jargon. Indeed 
it has been estimated that to read the privacy policies for 
all the websites an American Internet user visits annually 
would take about 244 hours per year [83]. Privacy policies 
also read like contracts because regulators aim to enforce 
them like contracts [25]. Notices may further be purpose­
fully vague to avoid limiting potential future uses of collected 
data [116]. The effect is that these notices are difficult for 
most people to understand [83, 111]. 
Lack of choices. Many privacy notices inform about data 
practices but do not offer real choices. Using a website, an 
app, a wearable device, or a smart home appliance is inter­
preted as consent to the data practices – regardless of the 
user having seen or read them. Even if notices are seen by 
users, they largely describe a system’s data practices, with 
few choices to opt­out of certain practices, such as sharing 
data for marketing purposes. Thus, users are effectively left 
with a take­it­or­leave­it choice – give up your privacy or go 
elsewhere [116]. Users almost always grant consent if it is re­
quired to receive the service they want [25]. In the extreme 
case, privacy notices are turned into mere warnings that do 
not empower individuals to make informed choices [25] (e.g., 
“Warning: CCTV in use” signs). Yet, privacy notices can 
only be effective if they are actionable and offer meaningful 
choices [33]. Awareness of data practices can enable users 
to make informed privacy decisions, but privacy controls are 
needed in order to realize them [113]. 
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Notice fatigue. Notice complexity and the lack of choices 
mean that most privacy notices are largely meaningless to 
consumers [25]. Users may feel it is pointless to read them, 
and most users don’t. A recent White House report [106] 
stated, “Only in some fantasy world do users actually read 
these notices and understand their implications before click­
ing to indicate their consent.” Furthermore, businesses may 
change their data practices and notices at any time, which 
means any effort spent on understanding the notice may 
have been in vain [116]. Privacy notices and security warn­
ings are often shown at inopportune times when they conflict 
with the user’s primary task [63], therefore they are dis­
missed or accepted without scrutiny. Frequent exposure to 
seemingly irrelevant privacy notices results in habituation, 
i.e., notices are dismissed without even registering their con­
tent [6, 56]. Further, a notice’s framing, distractions or time 
delays can reduce the notice’s effectiveness [3]. 
Decoupled notices. Some systems decouple a privacy no­
tice from the actual system or device, for example by provid­
ing it on a website or in a manual. Privacy notices are not 
only relevant for websites, mobile apps, or surveillance cam­
eras, but for the whole gamut of systems and devices that 
process user information. Designing and providing appropri­
ate notices for novel systems, such as smart home appliances 
or wearable devices, is challenging [48]. The straightforward 
approach is to decouple the privacy notice from the system. 
For example, many manufacturers of fitness tracking devices 
provide a privacy policy on their websites, while the actual 
device does not provide any privacy notices [103]. As a re­
sult, users are less likely to read the notice and may therefore 
be surprised when they realize that their mental models do 
not match the system’s actual data practices [48]. 
These issues paint a somewhat dire picture of the state 
of privacy notices. However, just abandoning the concept 
of notice is not a viable option, as the transparency notices 
should provide is essential for users, businesses, and regu­
lators alike [107]. We argue that many of these issues can 
be addressed by placing the emphasis on how privacy no­
tices are designed. Instead of providing notice merely to 
fulfill legal and regulatory requirements, notices should ef­
fectively inform users about data practices and provide ap­
propriate choices. Some proposed solutions point in that 
direction, such as multi­layered privacy notices [9], just­in­
time notices [101], and notices focused on unexpected data 
practices [48, 107]. However, so far, there is little guid­
ance on the actual design and integration of such notices 
into real­world systems. Next, we identify requirements and 
best practices for effective and usable privacy notice design. 
3.	 REQUIREMENTS & BEST PRACTICES 
FOR PRIVACY NOTICE DESIGN 
In order to make privacy notices effective and usable, they 
should not be tacked on after the system has been completed 
but instead be integrated into a system’s design. Privacy 
notices and choice options can then be designed for specific 
audiences and their notice requirements, and take into ac­
count a system’s opportunities and constraints. 
In this section, we identify common requirements, nec­
essary considerations, and best practices for privacy notice. 
These aspects are based on a survey of the usable privacy lit­
erature and an analysis of existing privacy design and assess­
ment frameworks, such as Privacy by Design [36], privacy 
impact assessments [136], and proposals for layered notice 
design [9, 26, 94]. 
Together with the design space presented in the next sec­
tion, the requirements and best practices discussed in this 
section provide guidelines and a toolbox for system design­
ers and researchers that can aid them in the development of 
usable and more effective privacy notices for their systems. 
3.1 Understand Privacy in the System 
The first step in designing effective privacy notices is to 
understand a system’s information flows and data practices 
in order to determine whether privacy notices are needed, 
who should be notified, and about what. Such an assess­
ment can be conducted as part of a privacy impact assess­
ment (PIA) [136], which further serves the purpose of iden­
tifying privacy risks associated with the system and making 
recommendations for privacy­friendly systems design. PIAs 
are becoming an essential – in some countries mandatory 
– aspect of systems design [134]. They serve the broader 
goal of ensuring a system’s legal and regulatory compliance, 
as well as informing privacy by design and risk mitigation. 
A common approach in existing PIA frameworks [135, 136] 
is to first assess if the system collects or processes privacy­
sensitive information to determine if a full PIA is required. 
The next step is to describe the system in detail, including 
its information flows and stakeholders. This description is 
the basis for analyzing the system’s privacy implications and 
risks [36, 37]. A PIA produces a report detailing identified 
issues and recommendations on how to address them. 
The resulting recommendations for privacy improvements 
may include changing collection practice, or identifying op­
portunities for data minimization. Data minimization re­
duces the risk of using data in ways that deviate from users’ 
expectations as well as liability risks associated with data 
theft and unintended disclosure [48]. As an additional ben­
efit, it also reduces the complexity of data practices that 
need to be communicated to users in privacy notices. If 
done early in a system’s design process, this may also be 
an opportunity to consider and improve system constraints 
related to privacy. For example, recognizing that a video 
camera is collecting information, the device designers may 
decide to include a light or other signal indicating when the 
camera is on. The PIA report and data practices should be 
updated to reflect any privacy­friendly improvements. This 
process may involve multiple iterations. 
Conducting a PIA informs notice design by helping to 
determine if notices are necessary in the first place, providing 
an overview of data practices for which notice should be 
given, potentially reducing the complexity of data practices, 
and determining the audiences that need to be considered in 
notice design. The outcome of a PIA is a deep understanding 
of a system’s privacy characteristics, which can be codified 
in a comprehensive privacy policy. 
A privacy policy describes a system’s data practices in­
cluding all relevant parameters, namely what data is being 
collected about users (and why), how this information is be­
ing used (and why), whether it is shared with third parties 
and for what purposes, how long information is retained, as 
well as available choice and access mechanisms [45]. This 
full privacy policy serves as the definitive (and legally bind­
ing) privacy notice. As such, it may be a long and complex 
document, which primarily serves the company to demon­
strate transparency and regulatory compliance. It is there­
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fore mainly relevant for businesses and regulators and less 
interesting or useful to users. However, a well­defined pri­
vacy policy can serve as the basis for designing concise, user­
friendly privacy notices as it maps out the different data 
practices about which users may need to be informed. 
3.2 Different Notices for Different Audiences 
Privacy impact assessments and the creation of privacy 
policies are well­known and established concepts, but notice 
design often stops with the privacy policy. Whereas the full 
privacy policy may be sufficient for businesses and regula­
tors, the key challenge is to design effective privacy notices 
for users. Therefore, one needs to understand which audi­
ences have to be addressed by notices [23]. While determin­
ing a website’s audience may be straightforward (typically 
the visitors of the website), mobile applications, wearables, 
smart cars, or smart home appliances expand the audiences 
and user groups that need to be considered. Such systems 
may have a primary user, but potentially also multiple users 
with different privacy preferences. For example, a home lock 
automation system may collect information about all family 
or household members, including guests [123]. Wearables, 
such as Google Glass, may incidentally collect information 
about bystanders. Social media and mobile applications en­
able users to share information with and about others, e.g., 
by tagging someone in a geo­referenced photo. 
To determine the different audiences for privacy notices, 
the set of all data practices specified in the privacy pol­
icy needs to be analyzed to determine which data practices 
affect which audience. Typical audience groups are the pri­
mary user of a system; secondary users, such as household 
members, having potentially less control over the system; 
and incidental users, such as bystanders, who may not even 
be aware that information about them is collected by a sys­
tem. Depending on the system, other or additional audience 
groups may need to be considered. There may also be reg­
ulatory requirements applying to specific audience groups, 
such as children [85], that have to be considered. 
While some audience groups may be affected by the same 
data practices (e.g., data collection about the primary user 
and other household members by a smart home system), 
other groups may only be affected by very specific data prac­
tices (e.g., while all of a wearable’s data practices affect the 
primary user, bystanders are only effected if they’re inciden­
tally recorded by the device, for instance, when the primary 
user takes a photo or video with a wearable device). 
3.3 Relevant and Actionable Information 
To be effective and draw the user’s attention, privacy no­
tices must contain relevant information. For each audience, 
one should identify those data practices that are likely un­
expected for this audience in the prevalent transaction or 
context. Those practices are relevant because they cross 
contextual boundaries [82] and thus violate contextual in­
tegrity [15, 91]. Providing notice and choice for such prac­
tices should be prioritized. The FTC notes with respect to 
the IoT that not every data collection requires choice, but 
that users should have control over unexpected data prac­
tices, such as data sharing with third parties [48]. FTC 
chairwoman Ramirez explains this rationale as follows [107]: 
“Consumers know, for instance, that a smart thermostat is 
gathering information about their heating habits, and that a 
fitness band is collecting data about their physical activity. 
But would they expect this information to be shared with 
data brokers or marketing firms? Probably not.” In these 
cases, users need clear privacy notices. 
If possible, one should not only rely on estimations of 
what may be expected or unexpected. User surveys and ex­
periments can reveal actual privacy expectations. Creating 
personas [90] that represent different members of a specific 
audience group can help ensure that less obvious concerns 
are appropriately considered. 
For each data practice, all parameters relevant for creat­
ing a notice should be gathered. For instance, for a data 
collection practice this may include by whom information is 
collected, why, how it is used, for how long it is retained, and 
if and how it is eventually deleted. For third­party sharing 
practices, it is relevant with whom information is shared, 
why, and whether and how usage is restricted or limited in 
time. Data protection regulation may also provide specific 
notice requirements (e.g., [41, 42, 43]). 
Regardless of regulatory requirements, additional infor­
mation should be compiled about data practices – especially 
unexpected ones – to ensure the effectiveness of notices pro­
vided to users. The notice should help the recipient make 
informed privacy decisions. This can be achieved by iden­
tifying reasons or benefits for the practice with regard to 
a specific audience, determining implications and risks for 
the respective audience, and identifying remedies or choices 
available to the respective audience. Providing reasons of­
fers the opportunity to explain the purpose of a potentially 
unexpected, yet benign data practice [85]. Communicating 
risks [16], for instance with examples [59], supports an indi­
vidual’s assessment of privacy implications, especially when 
data practices are complex or abstract. Offering specific 
choices makes the information actionable. 
3.4 System Constraints and Opportunities 
A specific system may impose constraints on privacy no­
tices that need to be considered in their design. In general, 
aspects to consider are the different interfaces provided by a 
system, including their input and output modalities, as well 
as their relation to specific audience groups. Specific inter­
faces may have further constraints, such as limited screen 
real estate. For instance, the FTC [48] notes that providing 
notice and choice in the context of the IoT can be challenging 
due to the ubiquity of devices, persistence of collection, and 
practical obstacles for providing information if devices lack 
displays or explicit user interfaces. Similar issues have al­
ready been recognized in the context of ubiquitous comput­
ing [74]. Designing notices for specific audiences may further 
be limited by how the respective audience can be reached or 
how they can communicate their privacy choices [103]. 
Systems may also provide opportunities that can be lever­
aged to provide a layered and contextualized notice concept 
for each audience, and potentially even integrate privacy no­
tices and controls into a user’s primary activity [113]. By 
recognizing the constraints, designers may be able to find 
creative and perhaps novel ways for giving notice. For in­
stance, the lack of explicit user interfaces on a device can 
be compensated with privacy dashboards, video tutorials, 
privacy icons or barcodes on the device, and offering choices 
at the point of sale or in setup wizards [48]. Identified con­
straints may also be addressed by considering notice mech­
anisms as part of the system design, i.e., adjusting system 
features to accommodate notices and controls. 
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3.5 Layered and Contextualized Notices 
While it may be essential to be transparent about many 
aspects of a system’s data practices, showing everything at 
once in a single notice is rarely effective. Instead, all but the 
most simple notices should consist of multiple layers. Multi­
layered notices constitute a set of complementary privacy 
notices that are tailored to the respective audience and the 
prevalent contexts in which they are presented. The granu­
larity of information provided in a specific notice layer must 
be appropriate for the respective context. For example, a 
full privacy policy can be complemented by short and con­
densed notices summarizing the key data practices [9, 85]. 
Just­in­time or transactional notices provide notice about 
a specific data practice when it becomes relevant for the 
user [47], for example, informing about how contact infor­
mation is used or whether it is shared with third parties 
when a user registers on a website. 
A multi­layered notice concept combines notices shown at 
different times, using different modalities and interfaces, and 
varying in terms of content and granularity in a structured 
approach. For example, some data practices may not require 
an immediate notice, particularly those that are consistent 
with users’ expectations [46]. It can be expected that a fit­
ness tracker collects information about the user’s physical 
activities – this is the main purpose of the device – thus 
this collection does not necessarily require prior notice. Au­
tomatically uploading a user’s activity data to a server or 
sharing it with other apps may be less expected, thus ap­
propriate notice and choice should be given [85]. 
Any specific notice should include only the information 
and control options most relevant and meaningful to a spe­
cific audience at that time. Following the details­on­demand 
pattern [118], initial notices can either point towards addi­
tional information and controls or be complemented with 
alternative user interfaces to review data practices or pri­
vacy settings. Deciding what information to include in an 
initial short notice is a crucial aspect at this stage, because 
users are more likely to provide consent to the short notice 
than click through to a more detailed privacy notice. Thus, 
if such a short notice does not capture all relevant informa­
tion it may hide information and impair transparency [84]. 
This is especially an issue for unexpected data practices. 
Therefore, the notice concept should structure notice layers 
hierarchically in such a way that the smallest notice either 
already captures the main aspects of the data practice or 
draws attention to more expressive notices. Subsequent lay­
ers may add additional characteristics. 
Designers further need to be aware of not overwhelming 
users with privacy notices. While many data practices may 
warrant a notice, providing too many or repetitive privacy 
notices can result in habituation – users click notices away 
without considering their content. After a few repetitions, 
the content of a warning literally does not register anymore 
in the user’s brain [5, 6]. Finding the appropriate number of 
notices may require user testing. Polymorphic messages [5] 
or forcing interaction with the notice [21, 22] can reduce 
habituation effects. A good practice is to prioritize what and 
when notices are shown based on privacy risks associated 
with the respective data practice [49]. 
An example for multi­layered design is the Microsoft Kinect 
sensor. This device uses video, depth­cameras, and audio 
to enable users to interact with games through motion and 
speech. The Kinect has two LEDs that indicate whether 
motion detection is active or whether video and audio are 
being recorded and potentially sent to a server. Users can 
further access a full privacy notice through the screen to 
which the Xbox is connected, as well as on the Xbox web­
site [137]. Unfortunately, the LED indicators alone cannot 
make users aware of what information is being collected or 
shared for what purposes, whereas the policy will likely be 
ignored by most users. Thus, additional notice layers could 
enhance awareness and obtain informed consent from users. 
In Section 4 we introduce a design space for privacy notices 
that supports the development of a layered and contextual­
ized notice concept by exposing the relevant dimensions that 
can be leveraged in the design of individual notices, namely 
the timing, channel, and modality of notices, as well as the 
control options a notice may provide. 
3.6 User-centered Design and Evaluation 
Once a notice concept has been developed for each audi­
ence, individual notices can be designed and evaluated in a 
user­centered design process, or by engaging users in par­
ticipatory design [130]. When conceptual notices for differ­
ent audiences overlap in terms of timing, channel, modality 
and content, they can potentially be combined into a single 
notice serving multiple audiences, as long as the resulting 
notice meets the requirements of each audience group. 
User testing and usability evaluation of notices can be in­
tegrated into a system’s overall evaluation and quality assur­
ance processes. One should evaluate the individual notices, 
as well as their combination and the overall notice concept. 
Notices should be evaluated in the context of the actual sys­
tem or system prototypes to ensure that they integrate well 
into the system’s interaction design. The effectiveness of no­
tices and warnings can be evaluated along multiple dimen­
sions, such as user attention, comprehension, and recall [8, 
12]. It is also important to evaluate whether notices help 
users make informed choices, both about using a particular 
service and about exercising choice options [40, 66, 67]. 
Typically, notices should be evaluated in rigorous user 
studies. However, budget and time constraints may not al­
ways allow for extensive evaluation. In such cases, expert 
evaluation with usability heuristics [89] can provide at least 
some indication of the notices’ effectiveness. Crowdsourcing 
platforms also offer an opportunity for conducting quick and 
inexpensive evaluations of privacy notice design [14]. 
The outlined best practices support the development of a 
comprehensive set of privacy notices tailored to a system’s 
different audiences. In the next section, we describe the 
design space of privacy notices in detail to effectively support 
the design of individual notices as well as audience­specific 
notice concepts. 
4. DESIGN SPACE OF PRIVACY NOTICES 
The design practices outlined in the previous section help 
to integrate notice design into a system’s development pro­
cess. The purpose of the design space described in this sec­
tion is to aid the design of specific notices by supporting 
system designers and privacy engineers in considering the 
design dimensions of privacy notices. The design space also 
provides a taxonomy and vocabulary to compare, categorize, 
and communicate about different notice designs – within a 
product team as well as with other involved stakeholders, 
such as the legal department, responsible for drafting the pri­
vacy policy, and management. The design space approach 
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has also been used in other privacy and security research, 
for example, for the creation of a taxonomy of social net­
work data [112], the investigation of web browser Privacy 
Enhancing Technologies (PETs) [138], and the examination 
of interfaces for anti­phishing systems [28]. 
We constructed our design space according to design sci­
ence principles [102, 126]. Following Peffers et al.’s research 
methodology [102], we developed and refined the design space 
in an iterative process, starting with an extensive literature 
review and the collection and assessment of multiple existing 
information systems and their privacy notices. This resulted 
in an initial privacy notice taxonomy, for which we collected 
feedback in informal discussions with about 20 privacy ex­
perts and professionals in summer 2014 at the Symposium 
on Usable Privacy and Security [120] and at the Workshop 
on the Future of Privacy Notice and Choice [30]. In further 
iterations, we refined the design space by taking the expert 
feedback into consideration and assessing the applicability 
and expressiveness of the design space in the context of sev­
eral scenarios grounded in existing privacy notices. 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the design space. Its 
main dimensions are a notice’s timing (when it is provided), 
channel (how it is delivered), modality (what interaction 
modes are used), and control (how are choices provided). In 
the following, we describe each dimension in detail. Note, 
that it often makes sense to consider these dimensions in 
parallel rather than in sequence, as different dimensions can 
impact each other. Furthermore, the options for each di­
mension presented here are not meant to be exclusive. The 
design space can be extended to accommodate novel systems 
and interaction methods. 
4.1 Timing 
Timing has been shown to have a significant impact on 
the effectiveness of notices [12, 40, 56, 100]. Showing a no­
tice at an inopportune time may result in users ignoring the 
notice rather than shifting their attention to it [132]. De­
lays between seeing a notice and making a privacy decision 
(e.g., caused by distractions) can change the user’s percep­
tion of the notice [98] and even cancel out a notice’s effect [3]. 
Thus, users may make different decisions at different points 
in time, depending on what primary task they are engaged 
in, information provided in a notice, and other contextual 
factors [2]. A comprehensive notice concept should provide 
notices at different times tailored to a user’s needs in that 
context. We describe six possible timing opportunities here. 
4.1.1 At setup 
Notice can be provided when a system is used for the first 
time [85]. For instance, as part of a software installation 
process users are shown and have to accept the system’s 
terms of use. Receiving and acknowledging a HIPAA privacy 
notice [125] when checking into a doctor’s office in the U.S. 
can also be considered a setup notice – even if provided on 
paper. Typically, privacy notices shown at setup time are 
complemented by a persistently available privacy policy that 
can be accessed retrospectively by users on demand. 
An advantage of providing notices at setup time is that 
users can inspect a system’s data practices before using or 
purchasing it. The system developer may also prefer to pro­
vide information about data practices before use for liabil­
ity and transparency reasons. Setup notices can be used to 
make affirmative privacy statements to gain user trust. For 
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Figure 1: The privacy notice design space. 
example, a form to sign up for an email newsletter may con­
tain a concise statement that email addresses are not shared 
with third parties [24]. Setup notices also provide the oppor­
tunity to explain unexpected data practices that may have 
a benign purpose in the context of the system [85]. Such 
explanations can be integrated into the system’s setup wiz­
ard or video tutorials. Showing privacy information before a 
website is visited can even impact purchase decisions. Egel­
man et al. found that participants were more likely to pay 
a premium at a privacy­protective website when they saw 
privacy information in search results, as opposed to on the 
website after selecting a search result [40]. 
However, privacy notices at setup also have multiple short­
comings. Users have become largely habituated to install­
time notices, such as end­user license agreements, and ig­
nore them [19]. At setup time, users may have difficulty 
making informed decisions because they have not used the 
system yet and cannot fully assess its utility or weigh privacy 
trade­offs. Furthermore, users may be focused on the pri­
mary task, namely completing the setup process to be able 
to use the system, and fail to pay attention to notices [56]. 
Therefore, privacy notices provided at setup time should be 
concise and focus on data practices immediately relevant 
to the primary user rather than presenting extensive terms 
of service [85]. Integrating privacy information into other 
materials that explain the functionality of the system may 
further increase the chance that users do not ignore it. 
4.1.2 Just in time 
A privacy notice can be shown when a data practice is ac­
tive, for example when information is being collected, used, 
or shared. Such notices are referred to as“contextualized”or 
“just­in­time” notices [13, 68, 85]. Patrick and Kenny [101] 
first proposed just­in­time click through agreements in order 
to provide notice and obtain consent with a concise dialog 
specific to a certain data practice or transactional context. 
An example of notices triggered by data collection are cookie 
consent notices shown on websites in Europe [43]. Just­in­
time notices can complement or replace setup notices. 
Just­in­time notices and obtaining express consent are 
particularly relevant for data practices considered sensitive 
or unexpected [48, 85]. For instance, in the case of mobile 
apps, access to sensitive information such as the user’s lo­
cation, contacts, photos, calendars, or the ability to record 
audio and video should be accompanied by just­in­time no­
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tices [47]. Another example are cars with automatic head­
lamps that continually sense ambient light conditions; pro­
viding notice about this type of data collection might not be 
necessary. However, privacy expectations may be violated 
when this information is shared with an insurance company 
to determine how often the car is driven at night. In such 
cases, privacy notice as well as choices should be provided. 
While just­in­time notices enhance transparency and enable 
users to make privacy decisions in context, users have also 
been shown to more freely share information if they are given 
relevant explanations at the time of data collection [68]. 
Typically, just­in­time notices are shown before data are 
collected, used, or shared if express user consent is required. 
On websites, information about how collected data will be 
used can be presented near input fields in online forms [68]. 
Just­in­time summary dialogs [7] can show summarized trans­
action data before it is sent to a service provider. This ap­
proach is often used before applications send error or crash 
reports. Small delays to avoid interrupting the user’s pri­
mary task may be acceptable [100, 98]. 
4.1.3 Context-dependent 
The user’s and system’s context can also be considered to 
show additional notices or controls if deemed necessary [113]. 
Relevant context may be determined by a change of loca­
tion, additional users included in or receiving the data, and 
other situational parameters. Some locations may be par­
ticularly sensitive, therefore users may appreciate being re­
minded that they are sharing their location when they are in 
a new place, or when they are sharing other information that 
may be sensitive in a specific context. For example, Wang 
et al. [129] proposed a notice that provides cues to Face­
book users about the audience of their future post to help 
avoid oversharing. Facebook introduced a privacy checkup 
message in 2014 that is displayed under certain conditions 
before posting publicly. It acts as a “nudge” [1, 29] to make 
users aware that the post will be public and to help them 
manage who can see their posts (see Figure 2). In sensor­
equipped environments, such as smart homes, new users or 
visitors should also be made aware of what information is 
being collected and how it is used [74]. Privacy­preserving 
proximity testing could help determine when the user is near 
a sensor [10, 75]. 
Challenges in providing context­dependent notices are de­
tecting relevant situations and context changes. Further­
more, determining whether a context is relevant to an in­
dividual’s privacy concerns could in itself require access to 
that person’s sensitive data and privacy preferences [113]. 
However, providing context­specific support may help users 
make privacy decisions that are more aligned with their de­
sired level of privacy in the respective situation and thus 
foster trust in the system. 
4.1.4 Periodic 
Notices can be shown once, the first couple of times a data 
practice occurs, or every time. The sensitivity of the data 
practice may determine the appropriate frequency. Addi­
tionally, if the notice includes a consent or control option, 
it may be appropriate to obtain consent on different occa­
sions, depending on the context, user action, or data being 
collected. However, showing a notice more than once can be 
overbearing and can lead to notice fatigue [18] and habitu­
ation [6, 22]. Thus, repeating notices need to be designed 
carefully [5] and their frequency needs to be balanced with 
user needs. Data practices that are reasonably expected as 
part of the system may require only a single notice, whereas 
practices falling outside the expected context of use may 
warrant repeated notices. In general, it is also advisable to 
show a notice anew if a data practice has changed. 
Periodic reminders of data practices can further help users 
maintain awareness of privacy­sensitive information flows. 
Reminders are especially appropriate if data practices are 
largely invisible [10]. For example, in the health domain, 
patient monitoring devices in the home may remind users 
on a weekly basis that data is being collected. Those mes­
sages make the user aware of the on­going practice and can 
provide control options. Almuhimedi et al. [4] find that pe­
riodic reminders of how often a user’s location and other 
information has been accessed by mobile apps caused par­
ticipants to adjust and refine their privacy settings. Another 
example of periodic reminders are the annual privacy notices 
U.S. financial institutions must provide to customers [35]. 
A challenge with periodic notices is that they must be 
relevant to users in order to be not perceived as annoying. 
Reminders should not be shown too frequently and should 
focus on data practices about which users may not be aware. 
If a system has too many data practices requiring reminders, 
data practices can be prioritized based on their potential pri­
vacy impact or a combined notice can remind about multiple 
data practices. Individual reminders can also be integrated 
into an overall notification schedule to ensure that users are 
not overwhelmed. Rotating warnings or changing their look 
can further reduce habituation effects [5, 132]. 
4.1.5 Persistent 
Persistent notices can provide awareness of ongoing data 
practices in a less obtrusive manner. A persistent indica­
tor is typically non­blocking and may be shown whenever 
a data practices is active, for instance when information is 
being collected continuously or when information is being 
transmitted [34, 47]. When inactive or not shown, persis­
tent notices also indicate that the respective data practice is 
currently not active. For instance, Android and iOS display 
a small icon in the status bar whenever an application ac­
cesses the user’s location, if the icon is not shown the user’s 
location is not being accessed. Privacy browser plugins, such 
as Privacy Bird [34] or Ghostery [54], place an icon in the 
browser’s toolbar to inform users about the data practices 
or third party trackers of the website visited. Recording 
lights are examples of persistent notices that indicate when 
a sensor is active. Camcorders, webcams, the Kinect sensor, 
Google Glass, and other devices feature such indicators. 
An issue with such ambient indicators is that they often go 
unnoticed [105] and that most systems can only accommo­
date such indicators for a small number of data practices. A 
system should only provide a small set of persistent indica­
tors to indicate activity of especially critical data practices. 
Furthermore, persistent indicators should be designed to be 
noticeable when they are active. 
4.1.6 On demand 
All previous timing options pertain to the system actively 
providing notices to users. Users may also actively seek pri­
vacy information and request a privacy notice. Therefore, 
systems should expose opportunities to access privacy no­
tices on demand [85]. A typical example is posting a pri­
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vacy policy at a persistent location [74] and providing links 
to it from a website, app, or other privacy notices in the 
system. A better option are privacy settings interfaces or 
privacy dashboards within the system that provide infor­
mation about data practices; controls to manage consent; 
summary reports of what information has been collected, 
used, and shared by the system; as well as options to man­
age or delete collected information. Contact information for 
a privacy office should be provided to enable users to make 
written requests. 
4.2 Channel 
Privacy notices can be delivered through different chan­
nels. We distinguish primary, secondary, and public chan­
nels. A system may leverage multiple channels to provide 
different types of notices. 
4.2.1 Primary 
When a privacy notice is provided on the same platform 
or device a user interacts with, a primary channel is used 
for delivering the notice. One example is a privacy notice 
shown on the user’s smartphone that is either provided by 
the app in use or the operating system. Another example 
are privacy notices shown on websites. The defining charac­
teristic of a primary channel is that the notice is provided 
within the user’s interaction with the system, i.e., the user 
is not required to change contexts. Thus, a browser plugin 
that provides privacy information about a website (e.g., Pri­
vacy Bird [34]) would also be considered a primary channel 
as the notice is provided within the browsing context. 
Using a primary channel is typically preferable, because 
the notice is presented within the context of the system, 
which supports users in evaluating privacy implications and 
their privacy preferences [97, 113]. The primary channel is 
particularly suitable to provide notice to primary users, but 
can also be used to provide notices to secondary users. For 
instance, other household members can also be addressed by 
a smart home appliance’s privacy indicators. 
4.2.2 Secondary 
Some systems may have no or only limited primary chan­
nels that can be leveraged for privacy notices and obtaining 
consent [10]. Wearables, smart home appliances, and IoT 
devices are examples of systems with constrained interac­
tion capabilities. Such devices may have very small or no 
displays, which makes it difficult to display notices in an in­
formative way [103]. For instance, privacy policies are more 
difficult to read on mobile devices [119]. LEDs and other 
output features could serve as persistent privacy indicators 
but are often insufficient to communicate relevant aspects 
of data practices, such as for what purposes data is being 
collected or with whom it is being shared. Moreover, IoT de­
vices may be installed in remote or less accessible locations. 
The user may not be near the sensor device when a notice 
is generated. The user’s context may further constrain the 
use of primary channels for privacy notices. For instance, 
car owners cannot read detailed privacy notices while driv­
ing; users of Internet­connected gym equipment may only 
want basic information about data sharing while they exer­
cise, but may be interested in learning more about privacy 
implications when at home. 
In such cases, privacy notices can be provided via sec­
ondary channels, i.e., outside the respective system or con­
text. A secondary channel leverages out­of­band communi­
cation to notify primary and secondary users. For instance, 
secondary channels can be used to provide setup notices. 
Rather than showing privacy information on the respective 
device, choices could be provided at the point of sale (e.g., 
opt­outs or opt­ins for specific data practices) or as part of 
video tutorials [48]. Just­in­time, context­dependent, and 
periodic notices can be delivered as text messages or emails, 
or any other available communication channel. This requires 
that the user agrees to receive such notices and provides re­
spective contact information during setup [48]. For instance, 
the iOS update process gives the option to email oneself the 
terms of service instead of reading them on the phone. 
On­demand notices can be made persistently available at 
a well­defined location [74], such as posting a (multi­layered) 
privacy policy on the system’s website. Pointers to the pri­
vacy policy from the system or device (e.g., using visual 
markers [10, 48]) can ease access to that privacy notice layer. 
An increasingly common approach is to make privacy no­
tices and controls available on a companion device, e.g., on 
a paired smartphone rather than directly on the wearable 
or IoT device. Such companion devices provide larger dis­
plays and more input and output options to make notices 
more accessible. Companion devices can also act as privacy 
proxies [75] for a larger number of constrained devices and 
systems. Examples are centralized control centers for smart 
home and IoT devices [48], or privacy and permission man­
agers on mobile devices [4, 47]. 
4.2.3 Public 
Primary and secondary channels are targeted at specific 
users. However, some systems are not aware of the iden­
tity of their users, especially secondary and incidental users. 
In such cases, public channels can be leveraged to provide 
notice and potentially choices. Examples of public channel 
privacy notices are signs posted in public places to inform 
about video surveillance or a camera’s recording indicator. 
Public notices can also be supported by technology. IoT 
devices and other systems may broadcast data practice spec­
ifications wirelessly to other devices nearby [10] in so called 
privacy beacons [75]. For instance, a camera could inform 
about the purpose of its recordings, how long recordings are 
retained and who may access them. Such beacons can also 
inform about available privacy controls [69]. 
Public channels can also be leveraged by users to commu­
nicate their privacy preferences. Markers can be placed on 
physical objects to control object or face recognition [109]. 
A privacy beaconing approach can be used to broadcast pref­
erences to others nearby, for instance transmitting the wish 
to not be photographed to camera phones nearby [70]. 
4.3 Modality 
Different modalities can be used to communicate privacy 
notices to users. Which modality should be selected de­
pends on what the specific notice strives to achieve, the 
user’s likely attention level, and the system’s opportunities 
and constraints. According to the C­HIP model [32, 132], 
users process warning messages by switching their attention 
to them, extracting relevant information from the warning, 
and comprehending the information; a user’s attitudes and 
beliefs determine if the user acts on the warning. Privacy 
notices can target each aspect of this process and the choice 
of modality can increase the effectiveness. For example, if 
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users are engaged in a task that requires visual attention 
(e.g., driving), using audio to convey privacy information 
may be more appropriate. Note that not all modalities may 
be consistently available or effective. Accessibility issues due 
to physical or visual impairments need to be considered in 
notice design [128]. Users may also not hear or see a notice 
due to distractions, blocked line of site, or headphone use. 
Thus, it is important to evaluate the saliency of different 
modalities used in notice design [132]. 
We first discuss visual notices, including text and icons, as 
they are most common. Auditory and haptic signals can also 
be used to communicate privacy information. However, they 
have a lower capacity for conveying information compared 
to visual notices, which may result in a user preference for 
visual or textual notices [28]. Quite often, modalities are 
combined; for example, an audio signal may be used to draw 
attention to a visual notice displayed on a screen. Finally, 
machine­readable privacy notices enable the use of different 
modalities and representations depending on context. 
4.3.1 Visual 
Visual notices can be provided as text, images, icons, or 
a combination thereof. Presentation and layout are impor­
tant aspects in the design of visual notices [132], including 
colors, fonts, and white space, all of which can impact users’ 
attention and comprehension of the notice [28, 29]. 
Textual notices can convey complex ideas to users. How­
ever, linguistic properties have been shown to influence the 
perception of warning messages [58]; a notice’s framing af­
fects sharing decisions [3]. Specialized terms and jargon may 
lead to low understanding or the inability to make appro­
priate privacy decisions [14, 77]. Thus, designers should pay 
attention to a notice’s wording [132], including user test­
ing [14]. 
While today’s website privacy policies are often lengthy [64, 
83], privacy notices do not have to be. Relevant information 
can often be expressed more concisely than in prose. For 
instance, short notices for smartphone apps have been pro­
posed that convey useful privacy information in the form 
of risk or expectation scores [53, 79, 80, 88]. Privacy ta­
bles and privacy nutrition labels have also been proposed to 
summarize websites’ data practices [66, 84, 87]. Some pri­
vacy notice formats have also been standardized by industry 
or regulators, e.g., financial privacy notices in the U.S. [52]. 
Standardized notices offer a familiar interface for users, and 
ease comparison of products [66]. 
The effectiveness of notices can be increased by personal­
izing them to the specific user; for instance by including the 
user’s name in the notice [133] or leveraging other user char­
acteristics, such as their demographics or familiarity with a 
system [132]. An aspect related to personalization is the 
translation of textual privacy notices into the user’s lan­
guage. Failing to translate may leave international users 
uninformed about the privacy policy or unable to exercise 
control over their privacy settings [124]. 
Images, icons, and LEDs are further options for convey­
ing privacy information visually. Icons can quickly convey 
privacy settings or currently active data practices. They 
can be combined with a control switch to activate or deacti­
vate the data practice [48]. However, due to privacy’s often 
abstract nature, images or icons depicting privacy concepts 
can be difficult to develop. A number of icon sets have been 
proposed to represent various privacy concepts, both in in­
dustry [38, 78, 104, 108] and in research projects [29, 34, 
55, 61], with varying levels of success. For example, the 
AdChoices icon used by the online advertising industry and 
placed on web ads has been shown to have low user com­
prehension [78]. Physical indicators, such as LEDs, may use 
light to visually indicate data practices. LEDs do not have 
to be binary (on or off) but could leverage colors and blink­
ing patterns to convey different information [60]. Google 
Glass’ display is a transparent glass block that is visibly il­
luminated if the device is in use, which gives bystanders an 
indication of whether the device is active. 
The meaning of abstract indicators, such as icons or LEDs, 
often needs to be learned, thus requiring user education. 
Users may also not notice them [105]. However, when done 
well pictorial symbols increase the salience and likelihood of 
a warning being noticed [132], thus, combining icons with 
textual explanations in privacy notices may improve the ef­
fectiveness of the notice, yet, does not require that users 
learn the exact meaning of the icon. 
Visceral notices take an experiential rather than descrip­
tive approach [23]. For example, eyes appearing and grow­
ing on a smartphone’s home screen relative to how often the 
user’s location has been accessed [114] can leverage strong 
reactions to anthropomorphic design [23] to provide an am­
bient sense of exposure. 
4.3.2 Auditory 
Auditory notices can take at least two forms: spoken word 
and sounds. Spoken word may be the form of an announce­
ment, pre­recorded or otherwise. One familiar example is 
the announcement when calling a hotline that the call might 
be recorded before being connected to a representative. 
Sounds can be specialized for the device, or based on well­
known sounds in that culture. Calo discusses several exam­
ples of visceral notices in which audio signals can “leverage 
a consumer’s familiarity with an old technology” [23]. One 
example are digital cameras; although some digital cameras 
and smartphones do not have a physical shutter, they are 
often configured to emit a shutter sound to make secondary 
users (i.e., the subjects of the picture) and passersby (in­
cidental users) aware that the device is collecting data by 
taking a picture. A bill was proposed in the US Congress in 
2009 to make such camera shutter sounds mandatory [23]. 
The bill was not passed, however, some Asian countries have 
had such requirements for many years. 
Auditory warnings can also draw attention to data prac­
tices or other notices [132]. For example, the P3P browser 
plugin Privacy Bird emitted different bird chirping sounds 
depending on whether the website’s privacy policy matched 
the user’s specified privacy preferences [34]. Balebako et 
al. [13] used sounds to draw attention to occasions when 
game apps accessed the user’s location and other data during 
game play. Auditory notices face similar challenges as icons 
– unless familiar [23], their meanings need to be learned. 
However, they can draw attention to ongoing data practices 
or privacy notices requiring user attention, especially for sys­
tems and devices with constrained interaction capabilities. 
4.3.3 Haptic and other 
While not widely used for privacy notices yet, haptic feed­
back provides a potential modality to communicate privacy 
information. For instance, Balebako et al. [13] combined 
sound and vibration to notify users about data sharing on 
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smartphones. Similar approaches could be used in wearable 
devices without displays. 
Other modalities taking advantage of human senses, such 
as smell, wind, ambient lighting, or even taste [71], could 
be potentially leveraged for privacy notices as well. For 
instance, olfactory displays [72] could use chemical com­
pounds to generate a pleasant or disgusting smell depending 
on whether a system or app is privacy­friendly or invasive. 
Such approaches may warrant further exploration. 
4.3.4 Machine-readable 
The previous modalities directly engage the user’s senses. 
An additional modality offered by technical systems is to en­
code data practices in a machine­readable format and com­
municate them to other systems or devices where the infor­
mation is rendered into a privacy notice. This way, the ori­
gin system only needs to specify the data practices and can 
leave it to the recipient how the information is presented to 
the user, leveraging that system’s input and output capabili­
ties. This also provides the opportunity to present notices in 
different formats on different devices, or differently for spe­
cific audiences. However, there is also a risk that machine­
readable data practices are misinterpreted or misrepresented 
by a device. Transparent documentation, certification, or 
established guidelines on how the machine­readable format 
should be interpreted may alleviate this issue [110]. 
Maganis et al. equipped devices with small displays that 
show active QR codes, which encode recent data collection 
history and the device’s privacy policy [81]. Privacy bea­
cons [75] have already been mentioned as an approach to 
transmit machine­readable data practices to other devices. 
The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) is a stan­
dard machine­readable format for expressing data practices. 
Websites provide a P3P policy that P3P user agents, such 
as Privacy Bird [34] or Internet Explorer, can obtain and 
render. While P3P failed to reach widespread adoption [33], 
communicating data practices in a machine­readable format 
may gain acceptance in the IoT context [10, 113]. Smart­
phone apps or centralized command centers could aggregate 
privacy information from multiple constrained devices and 
offer a unified notice format and privacy controls. 
4.4 Control 
Whenever possible, privacy notices should not only pro­
vide information about data practices but also include pri­
vacy choices or control options. Choices make the informa­
tion in privacy notices actionable and enable users to express 
their consent and their privacy preferences. 
The typical choice models are opt­in, i.e., the user must 
explicitly agree to a data practice, and opt­out, i.e., the user 
may advise the system provider to stop a specific practice. 
However, choices need not be binary. Instead users can be 
provided with controls to refine purposes for which collected 
information can be used, specify recipients of information 
sharing, or vary the granularity of information collected or 
shared. The goal should be to provide means for users to 
express preferences globally and selectively [74] instead of a 
take­it­or­leave­it approach. Controls need to be designed 
well in order to not overwhelm the user with choices [115]. 
Furthermore, offering elaborate privacy controls can lead 
to oversharing over time, either because users feel in control 
and thus share more [20], or just because of the usability 
cost of managing the settings [65]. Therefore, default set­
tings need to be carefully considered [85], as they may be 
kept unchanged out of convenience or because they are in­
terpreted as implicit recommendations [2]. Notice can also 
give explicit recommendations, for example, as nudges that 
highlight beneficial choices [1, 4], or with social navigation 
cues that inform about others’ privacy choices [17, 99]. 
Controls can be directly integrated into the notice, in 
which case they may be blocking or non­blocking, or they 
can be decoupled to be used on demand by users. This may 
be desirable if the control panel is complex or if the notice 
provides only limited opportunities for integrating control. 
4.4.1 Blocking 
Setup, just­in­time, context­dependent, and periodic no­
tices may include blocking controls. A blocking notice re­
quires the user to make a choice or provide consent based 
on the information provided in the notice. Until the user 
provides a choice he or she cannot continue and the respec­
tive data practice is blocked. Blocking notices typically con­
stitute opt­in consent, e.g., when terms of service must be 
accepted in order to use the service, but ideally should pro­
vide more meaningful choices. For example, if a smartphone 
privacy notice states that the camera app can access the de­
vice’s location, users should be able to selectively allow or 
deny this access while still being able to use the app. 
An issue with such clickthrough agreements [101] is that 
users may click without reading the provided information. 
Moving away from just presenting yes and no buttons can 
increase engagement with the dialog. For instance, Fischer­
H¨ propose using a map metaphor on which the ubner et al. 
user has to drag and drop data onto areas corresponding 
to their sharing preference [50]. Bravo­Lillo et al. found 
that forcing users to interact with relevant information in 
the notice, e.g., by having to move the mouse cursor over a 
specific text, can effectively address habituation [21, 22]. 
4.4.2 Non-blocking 
Blocking controls require engagement, which can be ob­
trusive. Non­blocking controls can provide control options 
without forcing user interaction. For instance, Facebook and 
Google+ provide integrated sharing controls when users cre­
ate a post. Users who do not interact with these controls 
have their posts shared according to the same settings as 
their previous posts. The same dialog can also inform about 
a post’s audience [129]. Privacy notices can also link to a 
system’s privacy settings to ease access to privacy controls 
without blocking the interaction flow. 
4.4.3 Decoupled 
Some notices may not provide any integrated privacy con­
trols due to system or device constraints. They can be 
complemented by privacy controls that are decoupled from 
the specific privacy notice. For instance privacy dashboards 
and privacy managers enable users to review and change 
privacy settings when needed [47, 48]. Online companies, 
like Google, offer such privacy dashboards to control pri­
vacy settings across multiple of their services; advertising 
associations provide websites to allow web users to opt out 
of targeted advertising for all partners. Apple’s iOS provides 
a settings menu to control privacy settings for installed apps. 
Decoupled privacy controls may also take a more holistic 
approach by attempting to learn users’ privacy preferences 
from their control choices. Those learned preferences could 
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then be applied to other systems, for example, when a new 
device is connected to the user’s smart home system [48]. 
5. USE CASES 
The description of the privacy notice design space high­
lights the variety of potential privacy notice designs. In this 
section, we discuss privacy notice approaches in three dif­
ferent domains, how they map onto our design space, and 
identify potential design alternatives. 
5.1 Website & Social Media Privacy Policies 
The prevalent approach for providing notice on websites 
is to post the website’s privacy policy on a dedicated page. 
Audiences of a website’s privacy policy are primary and sec­
ondary users, as well as regulators. Websites typically pro­
vide notices on demand (timing), i.e., users need to seek 
and access the privacy policy if they want to learn about a 
website’s data practices. Website notices typically use the 
primary channel, because websites are not tied to a specific 
hardware or screen size, and are largely visual (modality). 
Privacy controls are often decoupled from a privacy notice 
(control), i.e., the privacy policy may point to a settings page 
that allows users to manage privacy, typically by opting­out 
of certain practices, such as data sharing with advertisers. 
The status quo of website privacy notices is a major rea­
son why notice and choice is considered ineffective [25, 33, 
116]. However, some websites have developed more effective 
notice concepts. For instance, Microsoft [86], Facebook [44], 
and others have implemented multi­layered privacy policies 
that are also interactive. Explanations are integrated into 
the privacy page and details are provided on demand rather 
than showing a long privacy policy. But improving the pre­
sentation of the privacy policy is not sufficient if users do not 
access it. Users require notices integrated into the website 
in addition to a privacy policy. 
One approach is to leverage different timing options, such 
as just­in­time and contextual notices. Notices can be shown 
when a data practice occurs for the first time or when the 
user uses a specific feature for the first time. Notices can 
be integrated into online forms to make users aware of how 
their provided data is used and with whom it may be shared. 
Browsers also provide just­in­time notices for resource ac­
cess, e.g., when a website wants to use the user’s location. 
Contextual notices can be used to warn about potentially 
unintended settings. For instance, Facebook introduced a 
privacy checkup warning when posting publicly, see Figure 2. 
This blocking notice explains the potential issue and offers 
integrated privacy controls. The same notice could be re­
alized with non­blocking controls, e.g., as a banner below 
the post entry field; by blocking the publishing of the post, 
users are forced to validate their settings. Also note that 
the dialog does not contain an “OK” button; the user needs 
to make a specific choice. 
Varying a notice’s channel is not meaningful for most web­
sites, because the primary channel is well accessible. How­
ever, secondary channels, such as email, SMS, and mobile 
app notifications, are being used by social media sites to pro­
vide privacy­relevant notifications, for instance, when one 
has been tagged in a photo or receives a friend request. 
Most privacy controls on websites are decoupled from spe­
cific notices. But account registration forms may require 
users to provide opt­in consent for certain data practices be­
fore the account can be created. Cookie consent notices as 
Figure 2: Facebook’s privacy checkup notice warns 
the user before posting publicly. 
required by European data protection regulation have been 
implemented as blocking notices, as well as non­blocking no­
tices, e.g., a banner shown at the top of a page that does 
not impair use of the website. 
5.2 Smartphone app permissions 
In contrast to websites’ privacy policies, privacy and per­
mission management on smartphones employs a more in­
teractive approach. Whereas websites manage privacy on 
their own, mobile platforms regulate who installed apps ac­
cess sensors and user resources (e.g., contacts and text mes­
sages). Currently, the two major platforms, Android and 
iOS, take different approaches in terms of how they pro­
vide privacy notices and controls to users concerning apps’ 
access to resources. In the following, we discuss how their 
approaches utilize different parts of the design space. We fo­
cus on the current versions of those platforms (iOS 8.x and 
Android 5.x). 
For both iOS and Android the smartphone itself is the 
primary channel. Both systems show privacy notices mainly 
on the device. Apps can also be installed via a secondary 
channel, namely a Web store for Android and the iTunes 
application for iOS. While this secondary channel is available 
via a computer, the notice design is almost identical to app 
installation directly on the device. 
In terms of modality, both systems primarily use visual 
notices. Android further requires apps to declare requested 
permissions in a manifest (machine­readable), while iOS apps 
may specify usage descriptions for access of restricted re­
sources (e.g., location or contacts). 
In their app stores, both platforms provide links to an 
app’s privacy policy, which users may access on demand. 
Android further integrates privacy notices into an app’s in­
stallation process (at setup). The user sees a screen that 
lists the requested app permissions, and the user must ei­
ther accept all permissions (blocking) or not install the app. 
When an app update changes the requested permissions, a 
similar notice is shown (periodic). 
The app installation process on iOS does not include any 
privacy notices. Instead, iOS shows notices when an app 
wants to access a resource for the first time, see Figure 3. 
These notices are blocking and ask the user to allow or deny 
the access request. The notice may contain a developer­
specified explanation [121]. In addition, many iOS apps in­
tegrate explanations into the application flow before the ac­
cess request is shown. As of iOS 8, the app developer can 
also choose to show the authorization notice in advance, but 
iOS enforces that a resource cannot be accessed without user 
authorization. In iOS 8, permission requests are not periodic 
and are only requested once [76]. However, iOS shows peri­
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Figure 3: iOS’s just-in-time notice with purpose ex-
planation (left) and periodic reminder (right).
odic reminders for apps that have permission to access the
user’s location in the background, see Figure 3. Both iOS
and Android also use a persistent location icon in the toolbar
indicating that location information is being accessed.
On iOS, users can access a privacy settings menu that
facilitates inspection and adjustment of privacy settings for
specific resources, globally as well as for specific apps (on de-
mand, decoupled). Android provided a similar option (Ap-
pOps) in a previous version, but the current version does
not allow users to change an app’s permissions. Users can
inspect an app’s permissions in the app store but the only
option for privacy control is to uninstall the app.
Thus, the main difference between the platforms is the
level of control afforded to the user. iOS users may choose
to deny an app access to any specific resource requested,
yet continue to use the app. In contrast, Android users
must accept all of an app’s permissions in order to use it.
Android could make better use of different timing options
for notices and offer more controls; iOS leverages the options
in the privacy notice design space more comprehensively at
the time of writing. However, Google announced in May
2015 that Android will also allow users to grant or revoke
permissions selectively in the future [39].
5.3 Photo & Video Lifelogging
Lifelogging [117] aims to support memorization and re-
trieval of everyday events. A common aspect of lifelogging
approaches is the recording of photos and videos at frequent
intervals, e.g., with GoPro cameras or neck-worn cameras
that automatically take a picture every few minutes. A ma-
jor issue with those technologies is that they not only record
the primary user but also bystanders (incidental users) [62].
Yet, privacy notices for lifelogging devices, such as the Au-
tographer camera [11] or Google Glass, are mainly targeted
at the primary user. They typically provide a privacy policy
on the manufacturer’s website, privacy settings in a mobile
companion app, or a web portal to control sharing and access
to the data stream (secondary channel, on demand, decou-
pled). Incidental users neither receive privacy notices nor
have options to control being recorded, except for a record-
ing indicator light or a shutter sound on some devices.
Based on the design space, we can consider alternatives
to notify and give control to incidental users. Ideally, in-
cidental users should be informed at the moment they are
being recorded or soon afterwards (just-in-time) and should
be given the opportunity to withdraw consent (control). No-
tices on the device (primary channel) are likely not effective,
as they may not be salient. In order to leverage a secondary
channel, e.g., send a notification to the bystander’s smart-
phone, the bystander would need to be identified in order to
determine whom to contact, which introduces additional pri-
vacy implications. Another option is to use a public channel,
for instance by wirelessly broadcasting a machine-readable
notice that a photo has been taken. The incidental user’s
device could render the notice visually and use sound or vi-
bration to draw attention to the visual notice (modalities).
A blocking control option does not make much sense in the
context of taking photos and videos, as the primary user
would have to wait until consent is collected from all by-
standers, even though bystanders and the user may be in mo-
tion. Thus, incidental users could be given the non-blocking
option to retroactively opt-out of being photographed. This
choice would need to be relayed back to the primary user’s
device, which could then either delete the photo or detect
and remove or blur the incidental user (which poses addi-
tional technical challenges that would need to be addressed).
While this could provide a viable solution, it also requires
bystanders to express their consent any time someone takes
a photo nearby, which may become cumbersome in crowded
places or at popular tourist spots. An incidental user’s pref-
erences could either be stored on their device, which then
could automatically respond to such photo notifications, or
the incidental user’s photo preferences could be broadcast
to photographers nearby [70].
6. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a design space that provides a structured
approach and vocabulary to discuss and compare different
privacy notice designs. This can support the design of pri-
vacy notices and controls. The design space should be lever-
aged as part of a comprehensive design process that focuses
on audience-specific privacy notice requirements and con-
siders a system’s opportunities and constraints, in order to
develop a notice and choice concept that is well integrated
with the respective system, rather than bolted on. Notices
should be evaluated in user studies.
A key aspect of effective notice design is the realization
that a privacy policy, which may be necessary for regulatory
compliance, is insufficient and often unsuitable for informing
users. Privacy policies need to be accompanied by a notice
concept that leverages the options provided in the notice
design space to provide information relevant to the targeted
audience and to make that information actionable by provid-
ing real choices. Actionability is important, because privacy
notices without control may leave users feeling helpless [100].
Empowering users with privacy controls increases their trust
and may result in increased use and disclosure [20].
Novel technologies and integrated devices, such as wear-
ables or the Internet of Things, pose new challenges for the
design of privacy notices and controls. Information collec-
tion is continuous and sharing paramount [73]. Public pol-
icy, legislation, and technological approaches need to work
together to enable users to manage their privacy in such sys-
tems. The identified best practices and the proposed design
space provide the means to reason about meaningful design
options for notice and control in such systems. For instance,
by leveraging alternative channels or modalities, and pro-
viding notices and control options at different times in the
information lifecycle. A future challenge is to develop and
provide tools to support the identification of notice require-
ments, system opportunities, and applicable options in the
design space, and explore the (semi-)automated generation
of notice and control interfaces.
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